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1 Introduction
There are large differences in income across cities (Moretti, 2012); yet, at the same time, all
cities, be they vibrant or lagging, present evidence of substantial inequality across their neigh-
borhoods. Indeed, it would appear that in some regions of the world income differences are
greater within than they are across cities. For example, Rosenthal and Ross (2015) report that
while the interquartile range in the distribution of city income in the US is about 25%, the cor-
responding figure for neighborhood income within these cities is as high as 55%. Moreover,
evidence suggests that within city income inequality is increasing both in the US (Watson, 2009)
and in Europe (Tammaru et al., 2016). Partly because income correlates with racial and ethnic
backgrounds, and partly due to social interactions in relation to the demand for housing (Card,
Mas and Rothstein, 2008), a salient feature of the urban landscape is residential segregation
along lines of race and ethnicity (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 1999; Boustan, 2011).
Various reasons can be forwarded for seeking to reduce income and ethnic segregation at
the city level. The first corresponds to reasons of local externalities. The socioeconomic charac-
teristics of neighborhoods have been found to affect individual performance in both education
(Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016) and the labor market (Bayer, Ross and Topa, 2008; Chetty, Hen-
dren and Katz, 2016) and to impact both criminal behavior (Damm and Dustmann, 2014) and
welfare use (Olof A˙slund and Peter Fredriksson, 2009). Exploiting variation in racial segregation
across US cities, Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) and Ananat (2011) further show that minori-
ties perform worse in more segregated cities. Hence, residential segregation could contribute to
amplify performance differences between income and ethnic groups. Second, multiple equilib-
ria are a prominent feature of neighborhood ethnic composition (Schelling, 1971; Card, Mas and
Rothstein, 2008) and, thus, public policies aimed at deconcentrating poverty can potentially be
welfare enhancing.
Policies aimed at deconcentrating poverty and minority population groups abound in OECD
countries (Cheshire, 2009). These initiatives, often known as income-mixing policies, fall into
two broad categories (Boustan, 2011). The first encompasses policies that encourage low in-
come households to move into more affluent neighborhoods and include, for example, the Sec-
tion 8 and the Moving to Opportunity programs in the US. The second category consists of poli-
cies that seek to improve deprived neighborhoods so as to attract higher income individuals.
Major programs falling into this category include the HOPE VI and the Community Develop-
ment Block Grant in the US and the URBAN projects in the EU1. While the reasons outlined
above are used to justify measures aimed at reducing segregation, income-mixing policies are
1Sweden and Denmark, in a policy more explicitly related to ethnic enclaves, adopted refugee dispersal mea-
sures in the late 80s to reduce the concentration of immigrants in specific neighborhoods and urban areas (Edin,
Fredriksson and Åslund, 2003; Damm and Dustmann, 2014). Around the same time, Singapore introduced eth-
nic quotas at the neighborhood level, limiting housing transactions that could further increase segregation (Wong,
2013).
1
controversial for three reasons (Cheshire, 2009)2. First, neighborhood effects are much smaller
than the raw correlations suggest (Topa and Zenou, 2015). Second, if income-mixing policies
work, investing in deprived neighborhoods will increase housing prices and cause gentrifica-
tion, suggesting that such policies might end up hurting (rather than helping) the low income
residents of the targeted neighborhoods. Finally, while income-mixing policies are costly, the
effectiveness of such initiatives is unclear. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to assess the ef-
fectiveness of place-based policies that invest in deprived neighborhoods in order to deconcen-
trate poverty and immigration. To this end, we evaluate the effects on population dynamics at
the neighborhood level of a prominent place-based policy implemented in the Spanish region
of Catalonia.
The Catalan Neighborhoods Act was passed in 2004 by the regional government with the ob-
jective of deconcentrating poverty and immigration through the improvement of public spaces
and public use facilities in some of the region’s most deprived neighborhoods. The policy was
adopted in the middle of the Spanish immigration wave, when the share of immigrant popu-
lation was rising rapidly, especially in low income urban neighborhoods (Fernández-Huertas,
Ferrer and Saiz, 2015). In the areas we study, immigration rose by more than 8.5 percentage
points in the three-year period preceding the start of the policy. The intervention was imple-
mented through annual calls for proposals, with an annual budget of 99 million EUR between
2004 and 2010. However, note that due to the fall in public sector revenues and the project length
(4 years), the degree of execution was low among those projects accepted in the 2008-2010 calls
for funding. For this reason, we focus on the 39 interventions corresponding to the 2004-2007
calls, with an average investment of 3,065 EUR per inhabitant. The intervention areas present
an average population of 13,000 inhabitants, reflecting one of the policy guidelines, namely that
of concentrating large investments in specific locations.
The selection process consisted of two rounds. In the first round, a deprivation index was
calculated for each application made, using 20 socioeconomic indicators of neighborhood char-
acteristics. Neighborhoods scoring above a certain threshold were included in the second round,
when the projects were ranked according to a final score determined by this deprivation index
(with a weight of 40%) and an assessment of the projects’ characteristics. Our pool of control
neighborhoods comprises the rejected projects and the projects accepted in the 2008-2010 calls
that were never executed. As the most deprived neighborhoods were treated first, the projects
accepted at the initial calls differ significantly from the control neighborhoods. Moreover, these
differences translate into differential pre-treatment trends in neighborhood population dynam-
ics, making it inappropriate to apply standard differences-in-differences estimators. We there-
fore adopt the Oaxaca-Blinder estimator, as developed by Kline (2011) and as recently used in
Busso, Gregory and Kline (2014) and Kline and Moretti (2014), to evaluate place-based policies.
2An additional cost of income-mixing policies might be the disruptive effects of mobility on teenagers (Gib-
bons, Silva and Weinhardt, 2016; Chetty, Hendren and Katz, 2016).
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Interestingly, here, we have access to all the neighborhood indicators used by the policy-makers
when selecting the treated, which reduces the risk that unobserved neighborhood characteris-
tics confound our treatment estimates.
The results suggest that the urban renewal projects had no effects on the population dynam-
ics of the intervention areas, indicating that substantial investment in public spaces and facili-
ties is insufficient to attract native and/or high income households to deprived neighborhoods.
The one notable exception are the urban renewal projects carried out in the historic districts of
Barcelona, the one large metropolitan area in the region. Here, the policy attracted native and
EU15 college graduates. Overall, the policy reduced the share of non-EU15 immigrants by more
than 5 percentage points and increased the share of population with a college degree by 16 per-
centage points. Since the late 1990s, the Barcelona city center has experienced an urban revival
process and our findings suggest that the Neighborhoods Act intensified this process in some of
the city’s most deprived historic districts.
To guide the empirical findings, we develop a residential choice model with two neighbor-
hoods and two population groups: natives and (low-income) immigrants. Native and immi-
grant neighborhood valuations rise in line with increased urban renewal investment, and the
two groups present idiosyncratic residential preferences with regard to neighborhoods. Addi-
tionally, native utility is decreasing with the (square of the) immigrant share in the neighbor-
hood, giving rise to multiple equilibria in a one-sided tipping model to use the terminology of
Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008). In mixed equilibria, investment in the neighborhood increases
native willingness to pay more than immigrants can pay and, so, the place-based policy reduces
the immigrant share in the neighborhood. However, when the minority share lies beyond the
tipping point, urban renewal investment might be insufficient to attract natives to the neighbor-
hood and the policy will have no impact on the neighborhood’s ethnic composition. Our results
are consistent with this latter scenario in which the urban renewal policy is unable to reverse
the tipping process.
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Owens (2010), Ahlfeldt, Maennig and Richter (2016) and Koster
and Van Ommeren (2015) estimate housing externalities arising from urban renewal policies.
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Owens (2010) study a policy implemented in Richmond (Virginia)
while Ahlfeldt, Maennig and Richter (2016) examine interventions in Berlin following re-unification.
Using housing prices for renovated and non-renovated dwellings, these two studies estimate
housing externalities in terms of the extent to which the value of a property depends on the
quality of the nearby housing stock. While both papers analyze policies aimed at renovating the
private housing stock, Koster and Van Ommeren (2015) analyze a Dutch program that targeted
the public housing stock. They estimate the housing externalities caused by the policy in terms
of both prices and sales times. Our paper differs from these studies in two respects. First, instead
of estimating housing externalities, we assess the effectiveness of urban renewal measures for
reducing income and ethnic segregation in cities, the primary goals of these policies. Second,
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while the above papers study programs targeting the housing stock, we examine an intervention
that improved public spaces and public use facilities.
Our paper is closely related to Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) and Diamond and McQuade
(2016), who study the effects of affordable housing developments in the US financed by the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Although this policy is not strictly an urban regener-
ation program, some of the investments target disadvantaged neighborhoods. When focusing
on developments in the least attractive locations, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) find that these
interventions increase local housing prices, reflecting either better neighbors or the conversion
into new housing units of vacant buildings or unsightly empty lots. Similarly, Diamond and Mc-
Quade (2016)’s findings indicate that developments in disadvantaged areas cause a rise in local
housing prices as well as in the income and the non-minority share in the neighborhood3. The
results in this latter paper suggest that building affordable housing in disadvantaged areas can
be a more effective tool for reducing income and ethnic segregation than simply improving the
public spaces and facilities of these areas.
Our paper is also related to the literature (surveyed in Neumark and Simpson (2015)) that
analyzes the effects of enterprise zones, focused mainly on the US and France4. Although enter-
prise zones are also place-based policies that target deprived neighborhoods, they differ from
the urban renewal policy studied here in that they focus on tax incentives aimed at boosting
local employment.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we develop a theoretical framework to under-
stand the potential effects of urban renewal policies on the composition of the population in a
neighborhood. Section 3 describes the urban renewal policy studied here, while section 4 intro-
duces the data and the variables used. In section 5 we explain the empirical approach adopted
in the paper. The results are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a residential choice model with two neighborhoods and two popu-
lation groups (natives and immigrants). The model is a variant of those developed in Banzhaf
and Walsh (2013) and in Glaeser (2008) to examine racial segregation. The model’s key elements
include idiosyncratic residential preferences for neighborhoods, social interactions in housing
demand (endogenous amenities) as well as an exogenous amenity, whose value increases with
neighborhood investments. We use the model to study the neighborhood population responses
3In contrast, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) and Diamond and McQuade (2016) find that LIHTC developments
in more affluent neighborhoods decrease housing prices, reflecting a lower willingness to pay to live with lower
income neighbors.
4Studies of enterprise zones in the US include Hanson (2009), Neumark and Kolko (2010), Hanson and Rohlin
(2013) and Busso, Gregory and Kline (2014); while studies of the French experience include Gobillon, Magnac and
Selod (2012), Givord, Rathelot and Sillard (2013), Briant, Lafourcade and Schmutz (2015) and Mayer, Mayneris and
Py (2015).
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to an urban renewal policy.
2.1 Model set-up
There are two neighborhoods in the city. The size of neighborhoods 1 and 2 are fixed and given
by S and 1−S, respectively. In turn, there are two population groups, natives (N ) and immigrants
(I ), respectively. Each individual consumes one unit of housing and overall city population is
normalized to one, with P denoting the city-wide immigrant share. P1 and P2 are the immigrant
shares in neighborhoods 1 and 2, with P = SP1+ (1−S)P2. We restrict our analysis to equilibria
in which P1 ≥ P2. We further assume that S ≤ P < 0.5, to allow the possibility that neighborhood
1 becomes a ghetto (P1 = 1).
If residing in community 1, natives’ utility is given by U N1 = Y N−Q−α(P1)+γNG+an , where
Y N is income and Q is the price of housing in the neighborhood. The term α(P1) reflects that
natives care about the ethnic composition of the neighborhood. We return to the nature of the
function α below. Natives also value the exogenous amenity G where γN > 0. The amenity value
is assumed to increase as a consequence of urban renewal investments. The only individual-
specific utility component is an , which reflects the attachment of individual n to neighborhood
1, and it is uniformly distributed in the unit interval, i.e. an ∼U (0,1). In neighborhood 2, the
values of Q and G are normalized to zero, implying that natives’ utility in neighborhood 2 is
given by U N2 = Y N −α(P2).
Similarly, immigrants’ utilities in neighborhoods 1 and 2 are U I1 = Y I −Q+γI G+ai and U I2 =
Y I , respectively, with ai ∼U (0,1). Note that unlike natives, immigrants’ utility does not depend
directly on the neighborhood ethnic composition. This assumption is based on evidence that
suggests racial segregation is (largely) driven by the desire of non-minority residents to avoid
neighborhoods with a high minority share (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 1999; Card, Mas and
Rothstein, 2008; Boustan, 2011). We further assume that the natives’ income is higher than that
of immigrants (Y N > Y I ) and that γN > γI ≥ 0, as higher income is associated with a higher
willingness to pay for amenities (Kuminoff, Smith and Timmins, 2013; Kahn and Walsh, 2015)5.
To study the effects of investment on the population composition of the neighborhoods, we
focus on the minority share in neighborhood 1, which fully determines the proportions of both
groups in the two neighborhoods6. There are two types of equilibrium. In a mixed equilibrium,
neighborhood 1 is inhabited by both natives and immigrants (P1 < 1) while in a ghetto, neigh-
borhood 1 only hosts immigrants (P1 = 1).
Note that there are always immigrants in the two neighborhoods, implying that there is an
immigrant who is indifferent between neighborhoods, with a willingness to pay for neighbor-
hood 1 given by Q(ai∗) = γI G + ai∗ . In a mixed equilibrium, there is also an indifferent na-
5Koster, van Ommeren and Rietveld (2016) provide empirical evidence regarding this assumption for the case
of historic amenities in Dutch cities.
6Note that P2 = (P −S P1)/(1−S), while the proportion of natives in neighborhoods 1 and 2 are N1 = 1−P1 and
N2 = 1−P2, respectively.
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tive, whose willingness to pay to live in neighborhood 1 amounts to Q(an∗) = −α(P1)+α(P2)+
γNG + an∗ . In equilibrium, the two marginal residents’ willingness to pay must be equal, i.e.
Q(ai∗) =Q(an∗). Solving this equation gives us the equilibrium immigrant share and housing
price in neighborhood 17:
P1 = P + P (1−P )
S
(
α(P1)−α(P2)+ (γI −γN )G
)
(1)
and:
Q = 1−S+ (1−P )(−α(P1)+α(P2)+γNG)+PγI G (2)
If we assume that α is a linear function with α > 0, then there is a unique mixed equilib-
rium. This equilibrium will be stable if social interactions are moderate. Specifically, the equi-
librium will be stable if αP (1−P ) < S(1−S). Otherwise, the mixed equilibrium is unstable and
the neighborhood will be either in P 1 = 0 or in P 1 = 18. If the mixed equilibria is unstable, then
the resulting outcome is a two-sided tipping model to the use Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008)’s
terminology. In a two-sided model of this type, neighborhoods to the left of the mixed equilib-
rium evolve towards P 1 = 0 while those that to the right of it evolve towards P 1 = 1. This type
of equilibrium is inconsistent with the neighborhood dynamics documented in Card, Mas and
Rothstein (2008) and in Card, Mas and Rothstein (2011). In fact, the evidence supports one-
sided tipping models, which predict that mixed neighborhoods are dynamically stable for low
minority shares but that they quickly evolve towards a full minority equilibrium (P 1 = 1) once
they surpass the tipping point.
In order to obtain a one-sided tipping model, we assume thatα is quadratic, i.e. α(Pi )=αPi 2
with α> 0.9 If social interactions are sufficiently strong, i.e. α is sufficiently large, the model can
present two mixed equilibria. Then, the first of these (with the lower minority share) will be
stable while the second will be unstable, as illustrated in Figure 1(a)10. The solid line is the na-
tives’ willingness to pay curve. When the minority share is low, the willingness to pay increases
with P1 as preference heterogeneity dominates the social interaction effect. However, for higher
minority shares, the social interaction becomes relatively more important and the curve slopes
7We have used the fact ai∗ = 1−S(P1/P ), an∗ = 1−S((1−P1)/(1−P )) and P2 = (P −SP1)/(1−S).
8Specifically, if α is a linear function it turns out that
P1 = P +
(
(1−S)P (1−P )
S(1−S)−αP (1−P )
)(
γI −γN )G
9We obtain the same qualitative results if instead we assume that natives prefer to live in neighborhoods with
a minority share that is not too different from that of the city-average, i.e. α(Pi )=α(Pi −P )2.
10Formally, note that expression 1 is a function that maps into itself, i.e. P1 =H(P1), where mixed equilibria are
the values of P1 in which H intersects the 45 degree line. If H crosses the 45 degrees line from above (below), then
H ′ < 1 (H ′ > 1) and the equilibrium is stable (unstable). If α(Pi ) is quadratic, then H is an increasing and convex
function of P1. If α is sufficiently low, the model has one mixed (and stable) equilibrium. If α is sufficiently high,
then two mixed equilibria arise with the first (second) equilibrium being stable (unstable). The stability condition,
i.e. H ′ < 1, implies S/(P (1−P ))> (2αP1+2αP2(S/(1−S))).
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downwards. Since immigrants’ willingness to pay curve (dashed line) slopes downwards due to
preference heterogeneity, two mixed equilibria arise. Consider the low minority share equilib-
rium depicted in point A. If a shock decreases the minority share, the immigrants’ willingness to
pay curve exceeds that of natives and equilibrium is restored. Similarly, if there is a shock that
increases the minority share, the natives’ willingness to pay curve exceeds that of immigrants,
subsequently reducing the minority share. Hence, point A equilibrium is stable. The opposite is
true in the second equilibrium (point B), where any shock takes the minority share away from
the initial equilibrium.
Insert Figure 1(a) here
Models that feature social interactions in housing demand typically exhibit multiple equi-
libria. Here, note that point C in Figure 1(a) is also a stable equilibrium in which neighborhood
1 only hosts immigrants (P1 = 1). In such an equilibrium, no native wants to enter the neighbor-
hood, which is guaranteed by the following condition:
S
P
−α(1)+α(P2)+ (γN −γI )G < 0 (3)
The housing price is determined by the marginal immigrant. Specifically:
Q = 1− S
P
+γI G (4)
Finally, point D in Figure 1(a) is the model’s tipping point, which is the highest minority share
that can sustain a stable equilibrium11. With α quadratic, the tipping point (P t 1) is:
P t 1 = 1
1−2S
(
S(1−S)2
2αP (1−P ) −SP
)
(5)
No stable neighborhood can exist between point D (the tipping point) and P1 = 1, implying
that neighborhoods to the left of the tipping point are transitioning towards the ghetto equilib-
rium.
2.2 Impact of urban renewal policy on neighborhood ethnic composition
An urban renewal policy increases the neighborhood amenity level G ; however, the effects of
the policy will differ depending on the nature of the equilibrium considered. We first study the
policy effects in a mixed (and stable equilibrium). Then, we study the impacts of investing in a
ghetto. Finally, we discuss the role of the urban renewal policy as a "big push" policy that might
reverse the dynamics of neighborhoods that are tipping.
In a mixed (and stable equilibrium), the effects of increasing G on the minority share and
housing price of neighborhood 1 are given by:
11Formally, the tipping point satisfies H ′ = 1.
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dP1
dG
= γ
I −γN
S
P (1−P ) −
(
2αP1+2αP2 S1−S
) < 0 (6)
and
dQ
dG
= ((1−P )γN +PγI )− (1−P )(2αP1+2αP2 S
1−S
)
dP1
dG
> 0 (7)
Expression 6 indicates that investments in the neighborhood decrease the neighborhood
minority share. To see this, note that the numerator is a negative term as the natives’ willingness
to pay for G exceeds that of immigrants (γI < γN ). In turn, the denominator is a positive term.
In fact, this is the same condition that guarantees that the mixed equilibrium is stable (see foot-
note 10). In terms of the housing price, expression 7 shows that investing in the neighborhood
increases it. The first part of the expression is the city-level (weighted) average willingness to
pay for G , i.e. (1−P )γN +PγI . The second part indicates that higher G decreases the propor-
tion of immigrants in the neighborhood, which further contributes to the increase in the price
of housing. Hence, the housing price increase exceeds the willingness to pay for G as it also
incorporates the value that natives attach to the shift in the neighborhood’s ethnic composition.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the effects of such an intervention in the specific case where γI = 012.
Starting from a stable mixed equilibrium (point A), investing in the neighborhood increases the
natives’ willingness to pay to live in neighborhood 1, which shifts from the dashed to the dotted
curve. In the new equilibrium (point B), the minority share is lower and the price of housing
is higher. The arrival of native residents and the increase in housing prices in the intervened
neighborhoods are actually among the policy’s stated goals. This is also why income mixing
policies are controversial. Investments in the neighborhood might eventually harm the low
income residents of the treated neighborhoods. Note that higher amenities generate a price
increase that exceeds the immigrants’ willingness to pay. In our model, increasing G reduces
immigrants’ welfare as inframarginal immigrants in neighborhood 1 experience a housing price
increase that exceeds the direct utility gain of higher amenities13.
Insert Figure 1(b) here
The effects of the policy, however, may differ greatly if the minority share is very high in the
first place. In fact, in a ghetto equilibrium, small increases in G have no impact on the minority
share in the neighborhood as long as condition 3 continues to hold. This suggests that once a
neighborhood minority share is high, investments in the neighborhood are unlikely to attract
natives since the value that they attach to a high immigrant share offsets any utility gain from
a higher G . Despite there being no change in the ethnic composition of the neighborhood, the
12If γI = 0, then increasing G does not affect the immigrants’ willingness to pay.
13Of course, this model overstates the negative welfare effects of the policy since homeowners in the neighbor-
hood would be protected from the housing price increase.
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fact that there is a marginal immigrant implies that higher G increases the price of housing.
Specifically, inspecting 7 reveals that rasing G by one unit increases the price of housing by γI
units, which is the immigrants’ willingness to pay for G .
An important feature of urban renewal policies is that they are not intended to be marginal
interventions. Rather, the purpose of such policies is to bring about substantial changes in tar-
geted neighborhoods. Consider a neighborhood that is in a stable mixed equilibrium such as
point A in Graph 1(c) where, again, we have assumed γI = 0. Suppose that there is an increase
in the city-level minority share (P increases), which reflects the context in which the Neigh-
borhoods act was passed. As a consequence, the immigrants’ willingness to pay curve moves
upwards (solid gray line) and, as a result, this curve (solid line) exceeds that of the natives for all
values of P1. This neighborhood has tipped, and starts to lose natives until it reaches point B
where P1 = 1. Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) have shown that unstable neighborhood dynam-
ics are not rapid. Hence, urban renewal policies that are implemented when tipping has already
started but has not yet been finalized can restore the neighborhood’s stability. Specifically, in-
vesting in the neighborhood will shift the natives’ willingness to pay curve upwards (gray dashed
line). Hence, the policy might bring the neighborhood back to the left of the tipping point (equi-
librium C in this example). This seems to be the rationale underpinning the Neighborhoods Act,
as the policy’s goal was to deconcentrate poverty and immigration in a context where the immi-
grant share in deprived areas was growing rapidly.
Insert Figure 1(c) here
3 The urban renewal policy: the Neighborhoods Act
The regional government of Catalonia introduced the Neighborhoods Act (Lei de Barris) in 2004,
with the aim of revitalizing neighborhoods deserving of ‘special attention’. By means of massive,
geographically concentrated investments, the policy sought to improve public spaces and facil-
ities in the targeted neighborhoods, with the specific policy goal of deconcentrating poverty and
immigration and, ultimately, reducing income and ethnic segregation (Nello, 2009).
Between 2004 and 2010, there was an annual call for funding with an assigned yearly budget
of 99 million EUR, to be distributed among the selected projects submitted by the local coun-
cils14. The length of the projects was fixed at 4 years. The funds were channeled as transfers
from the regional government to the local councils. As a rule, the regional transfer could ac-
count for just 50% of the project, meaning that local governments had to cover the remaining
50%, possibly with transfers from other tiers of government. As discussed, the policy was clearly
focused on investing in public spaces. As much as 80% of the funds was spent on public spaces
and public use facilities, while an additional 10% was devoted to renovating the existing stock
14Each municipality could only be awarded one project per call (two in the case of Barcelona).
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of apartment buildings. Finally, the remaining 10% was spent on social services aimed at im-
proving the labor market performance of the neighborhoods’ residents. By way of example,
Appendix A shows the investments funded through the Santa Caterina & Sant Pere project, a 15
million EUR intervention carried out in Barcelona’s city center.
Across the seven calls for funding, of the 450 applications received 143 were granted. How-
ever, owing to the fall in regional and local government revenues, the degree of execution is low
among the projects accepted in the last calls. All projects from the 2004 to 2006 calls (46 in total)
were completed while, from the 2007 call, only 17 out of the 24 accepted projects were com-
pleted. Thus a total of 63 projects were executed (corresponding to the 2004 to 2007 calls) and
completed between 2008 and 2011. We exclude (what are mostly small) projects in municipal-
ities with less than 10,000 inhabitants. We do so because census tracts in these municipalities
(which is the finest geographical detail for which data are available) do not provide a realistic
approximation to neighborhoods. We also exclude a few cases in which the municipality un-
derwent a complete redrawing of its census tract borders in the period under study. Finally,
we focus on 39 interventions with an average investment of 3,065 EUR per inhabitant. The in-
tervention areas have an average population of 13,000 inhabitants, indicating that investments
were quite localized.
The selection process consisted of two rounds. In the first round, a deprivation index was
calculated for each application. The index considers a large number of indicators measuring
the following items: property value, characteristics of the housing stock (share of ≥ 4-storey
apartment buildings without elevator, share of apartments without piped water or sewerage
connection), high density, drastic population growth or decline, concentration of young and
old people, non-EU immigration, proportion of welfare benefit users, unemployment rate, per-
centage of low-educated inhabitants, percentage of people at risk of social exclusion, deficit of
public transportation, lack of parking space, lack of parks and green areas and a high vacancy
rate in commercial property. The areas with a score above a certain threshold were considered
in the second round.
In the second round, projects were ranked according to a final score determined by this de-
privation index (with a weight of around 40%), the population size of the treated area together
with more qualitative aspects of the project, including, the financial effort of the municipality,
the type of project (historic district renovation or not), the involvement of the local community,
and the adequacy of the project to policy goals. After ranking the projects on the basis of their
final score, the budget limit of 99 million EUR implicitly defined a ‘cut-off’, which varied across
calls depending on the proposed budget of the applicants at the top of the ranking.
The first column in Table 1 shows the average values of all indicators used in the depriva-
tion index as well as the population size of the 39 projects analyzed here. As explained above,
the projects were implemented in under-performing neighborhoods. Unemployment is about
three percentage points higher than the regional average (12.8 vs. 10.2%), while the share of in-
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dividuals (above 10 years) with no high-school diploma (or equivalent) is remarkably high (76%
compared to the regional average of 40%). Treated neighborhoods also show a high presence
of foreigners. In 2003, the share of non-EU15 immigrants was already high compared to the
regional average (13.9 vs. 4.9%). Moreover, it was rising rapidly as the share of non-EU15 im-
migrants increased by 8.5 percentage points between 2001 and 2004. This dramatic increase
is a consequence of the Spanish immigration wave, which meant Spain received almost 5 mil-
lion immigrants between 1998 and 200815. The increases in immigrant density experienced by
the treated neighborhoods are particularly high as immigrants tended to concentrate in low-
income urban areas (Fernández-Huertas, Ferrer and Saiz, 2015)), that is, the locations specifi-
cally targeted by the Neighborhoods Act16. In fact, the massive immigration wave, coupled with
its unequal impact across the neighborhoods in the region, was one of the main reasons why
the Neighborhoods Act was introduced in 2004 (Nello, 2009).
Insert Table 1 here
The control group consists of 68 rejected projects and 35 projects accepted during the 2008,
2009 and 2010 calls that, due to the fall in public tax revenues, present a degree of budget execu-
tion below 20%. The second column in Table 1 shows the average values of all the quantitative
indicators used in the program. The fourth column in the table reports differences between
treatments and controls. Overall, the treatment group scores higher on most of the indicators,
reflecting greater needs. For instance, unemployment is almost 4 percentage points higher in
treated than in control neighborhoods. In terms of immigration, in 2003 the treated areas pre-
sented a non-EU15 immigrant share that was 7.0 percentage points higher than that of the con-
trol neighborhoods.
The Neighborhoods Act does not overlap in space and time with any other major urban
interventions, which means that the estimated policy effects are not be confounded by con-
current urban policies. The EU URBAN projects are very similar in goals and nature with the
interventions studied here. However, only two such projects have been implemented in Cat-
alonia and neither coincide with the neighborhoods studied here. Likewise, Plan-E was a stim-
ulus investment plan launched by the Spanish Government in the midst of the great recession
(2008) and operationalized as transfers to local governments for investment. We analyzed all
Plan-E projects and confirmed that none of the accepted or rejected neighborhoods considered
herein receives investments of any significant quantitative importance in relation to the Neigh-
borhoods Act investments17.
15The largest inflows of (mostly low-skilled) immigrants originated primarily from Ecuador, Morocco, Romania
and Colombia. See Fernández-Huertas, Ferrer and Saiz (2015) and Jofre-Monseny, Sorribas-Navarro and Vázquez-
Grenno (2016) for a detailed description of the Spanish immigration wave.
16Public housing is quantitatively unimportant in Spain, hosting only 2 percent of households. In contrast to
other European countries, public housing is not an important factor driving immigrants’ locations decisions.
17Typically, Plan-E consists of many small projects scattered around the municipality.
11
4 Data and variables
We combine official data from the projects accepted and rejected under the Neighborhoods Act
with data on population characteristics at the neighborhood level. In the case of the accepted
projects, we have scores for all the indicators considered in the selection process (see Table 1),
the amount invested, the timing of the execution, as well as the project boundaries and the exact
location of all investments within these boundaries. One such project is illustrated in Appendix
B, where the solid line depicts the boundaries of the Santa Caterina & Sant Pere project, while
the colored areas indicate the specific location of all investments. In the case of the rejected
projects, we also know the scores for all the selection indicators, the budget proposal as well as
the project boundaries.
As for our outcome variables, namely, population characteristics at the neighborhood level,
we use yearly data from the municipal population register (Padrón municipal de habitantes) and
data drawn from the 2001 and 2011 Population Censuses18. The population register is a yearly
population count (with base date January 1st) containing information on an individual’s age,
gender and country of birth. The (decennial) population census contains further information,
including, the educational level attained by the individual. Both the Census and the population
register data are available at the census tract level (Sección censal), which is the most disaggre-
gated geographical level existing in Spain. Unfortunately, some information for the Census is
not disclosed in all tracts for reasons of confidentiality.
The intervention areas are typically made up of several census tracts. For the 142 treatment
and control neighborhoods, the average number of tracts is 7.2, while the average census tract
hosts 1,417 inhabitants. Although most project boundaries match the census tract borders, this
is not always the case. For example, the dashed lines in Appendix B identify the census tracts in
the Santa Caterina & Sant Pere project in Barcelona. Note that the project boundaries (solid line)
generally follow the census tract borders. However, in the north-eastern corner, there is a census
tract that is only partially included in the intervention area. In such instances, to compute the
population of the intervened area, we resort to imputations. Specifically, we do so based on the
share of developed land of each tract that belongs to the intervention area19.
In the case of the outcome variables, we are interested in the long-run population dynamics
at the neighborhood level. In terms of ethnic composition, we decompose the population into
three groups: Natives, non-EU15 immigrants, and EU-15 immigrants. We divide the immigrants
into these two groups as the policy goal is to reduce the concentration of non-EU15 immigrants
in the treated neighborhoods (Nello, 2009)20. For each of these three groups, we examine two
18See Foremny, Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2015) for a detailed explanation of the workings of the municipal
population register.
19To compute these shares, we use the SIOSE 2005 (Sistema de Información sobre Ocupación del Suelo de Es-
paña).
20According to the 2001 Census, immigrants born in EU15 countries have a higher level of education than both
non-EU15 migrants and natives. Therefore, individuals from EU15 countries can be seen as natives belonging to
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outcome variables by tracking changes that occurred between 2004 and 2013. The first of these
is the difference between the logged population levels in 2003 and 2014 and, thus, it approx-
imates the growth rate of each population group between these two years. The second is the
change in the percentage of each group over the same time window. We also study the popu-
lation dynamics of college graduates as this proxies high-income individuals. This information
is only available from the Census and, thus, we study the changes occurring between 2001 and
2011. Specifically, we examine differences in the logged stock of college graduates as well as the
changes in the percentage of this group in the neighborhood. Since the population by level of
education is not disclosed for all tracts in the 2001 and 2011 censuses, in a few cases, the areas
of intervention do not coincide exactly with the outcomes measuring changes in the population
by ethnic and educational backgrounds.
5 Empirical approach
The main equation of interest is:
∆Yi =αTi +X
′
iβ+²i (8)
where ∆Yi is a measure of population change in neighborhood i , Ti is a treatment indica-
tor while X
′
i is a vector containing the neighborhood characteristics used by policy-makers to
determine treatment. We focus here on long-differences. Specifically, we examine changes in
native, EU15 and non-EU15 populations between 2004 and 2013 and changes in the population
of college-graduates between 2001 and 2011.
As reported in Table 1, accepted projects between 2004 and 2007 differ from those that were
rejected and those that were accepted in the 2008-2010 calls but that were never executed. In
the bottom panel of Table 1, we test if treated and control neighborhoods also differ in pre-
treatment trends. Specifically, we check if treatments and controls are balanced in terms of the
outcomes of interest measured between 2001 and 2004. Prior to treatment, treated neighbor-
hoods experienced larger increases in the share of non-EU15 immigrants. As a result, treated
neighborhoods experienced more marked compositional changes, in which the share of natives
(non-EU15 immigrants) decreased (increased) more in the intervention neighborhoods. This
implies that the underlying assumption in the differences-in-differences setting, namely, the
parallel trends assumption, does not hold in our application. As a result, we adopt the Oaxaca-
Blinder approach developed in Kline (2011). The estimator procedure involves two steps. In the
first step, the control units are used to estimate the following auxiliary regression:
∆Yi = X
′
iβ+²i (9)
the upper tail of the income distribution.
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where the outcomes of interest, ∆Yi , is regressed on Xi , the vector containing all the indica-
tors listed in the top panel of Table 1. In some specifications, we also include the lagged outcome
measured during the pre-treatment period 2001-2004. In a second step, using the coefficients
estimated in 9, namely βˆ, the average treatment effect is given by:
AT T = µˆ− 1
NT
NT∑(
X
′
i βˆ
)
(10)
The first term of this estimator (µˆ) is the unconditional mean of the treated units while the
second term is the counterfactual mean (for the treated units) obtained when using the esti-
mated coefficients in 9, while NT is the number of treated neighborhoods. Note that this is the
estimator of counterfactual means developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Writing the
counterfactual mean for treated units in matrix form and replacing the coefficient estimates by
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) formula yields:
1
NT
D ′X (X ′W X )−1X ′W Y =wY (11)
where D is a vector weighting the treated observations while W is a matrix that only weights
the control observations. The expression preceding Y in equation 11 turns out to be a vector of
weights, denoted by w . Hence, the counterfactual mean for the treated units is a weighted aver-
age of the control outcomes. These weights have two important properties. First, they guaran-
tee that the mean of each and every control variable included in X is exactly the same in treated
and re-weighted control samples, as reflected in the third column of Table 1. Second, the w ’s
can be interpreted as those of a propensity score re-weighting estimator in which the weights
are proportional to the conditional odds of treatment. This estimator is particularly desirable in
settings, such as ours, in which the number of controls exceeds that of treatments and the vector
X contains a large number of variables (Kline, 2011). Moreover, in our application, the vector
of controls X contains all neighborhood features that have been selected by policy-makers to
determine treatment, reducing the risk that unobservable variables confound our estimates of
interest.
The dotted lines in Figure 2 illustrate the weighted averages for the shares of natives, non-
EU15 immigrants and EU-15 immigrants obtained from a specification in which the first step
(specification 9) only includes the indicators listed in the top panel of Table 1. While the treated
and the unweighted control samples show clearly diverging pre-treatment neighborhood dy-
namics, the treated and the re-weighted control samples show very similar pre-treatment trends.
This is formally shown in the last columns of the bottom panel of Table 1.
Insert Figure 2 here
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6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
In Table 2, we present the baseline results for Equation 10 including different sets of controls.
Each row corresponds to a different estimation and shows the effect of the urban renewal pol-
icy on a different outcome variable. Column 1 presents the results obtained when all variables
shown in the top panel of Table 1 are used as controls. Note that these are all neighborhood
characteristics used by policy-makers to select the treated neighborhoods. The estimates for
all the outcome variables are small and statistically insignificant. This evidence suggests that,
on average, the urban renewal policy had no effects on the population dynamics and educa-
tional composition of the intervention areas. The results for the shares of natives, non-EU15 and
EU-15 immigrants are illustrated in Figure 2. Each dotted line represents the evolution of each
variable for the reweighted control sample. Hence, the policy effect is the vertical difference be-
tween the treated (solid line) and the reweighted control sample. The graphs also indicate that
the urban renewal policy had little (if any) effect on population dynamics. Similarly, the graphs
show that the results do not hinge on the time window specified in the regression analyses.
Insert Table 2 here
As detailed in Table 1, the variables used for the treatment selection are drawn from three dif-
ferent sources: 1) the 2001 census; 2) the population registers; and, 3) data provided by the mu-
nicipalities when completing the project application. The variables corresponding to sources 2)
and 3) refer to different points in time depending on the specific call for funding in question.
The variables built from annual population registers, including the population level and the
share of non-EU15 immigrants in the neighborhood, can be measured prior to 2004 and we do
so throughout the analysis. Specifically, we measure these variables in 2003, which correspond
to the data used for treatment selection in the first (2004) call of the Neighborhoods Act. The
third group of variables cannot be measured at different points in time and, so, we include con-
trols that are not strictly pre-determined with respect to our outcomes. Thus, in column 2, we
show the results obtained when we re-run the main analysis excluding these controls when es-
timating equation 10. Fortunately, the results do not change substantially when these variables
are excluded. In column 3, we report the results obtained when, in addition to all the variables
used in column 1, we add the lagged outcome measured between 2001 and 2004. Although the
bottom panel in Table 1 suggests that treatment and the reweighted control groups show similar
pre-trends, there might be efficiency gains by directly matching on pre-treatment trends in the
outcome variable21. This is the most complete and, therefore, our preferred specification. The
results are similar to those above, pointing once again to the null effects of the urban renewal
policy on neighborhood population dynamics. For the sake of completeness, column 4 reports
21Busso, Gregory and Kline (2014) also match on pre-treatment outcomes.
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the OLS estimation. It should be noted that these results are very similar to those obtained with
the OB procedure.
6.2 Heterogeneous analyses
Although the baseline results indicate that, on average, there are no significant effects of the ur-
ban renewal policy on the population dynamics of the treated area, it could well be that these
results are heterogeneous with respect to the characteristics of projects and neighborhoods. In
Table 3 we focus on project heterogeneity while in Tables 4 and 5 we analyze the effects of in-
terest by different neighborhood characteristics. The estimates reported throughout this sec-
tion correspond to the more complete specification (column 3 in Table 2), which includes the
2001-2004 lagged outcome, and, as a result, pre-treatment trends between the treated and the
reweighted control samples are exactly matched by construction22. Exploring these heteroge-
neous patterns can also shed light on the reasons why the policy was, on average, ineffective.
6.2.1 Effects by project size
One prediction of the model developed in Section 2 is that, if the minority share is relatively
high, the policy will only be effective if the investment (G) is large enough to reverse the tipping
point. In Table 3, we present the estimations after dividing the interventions between those
with low and high levels of investment. We use three criteria to divide the projects by size: Total
amount invested, per capita investment, and per area investment. In the case of total invest-
ment (columns 1 and 2), we consider projects above and below the median (14 million EUR).
The results indicate that the impact of the urban renewal initiatives on neighborhood popula-
tion dynamics are null even for the sub-sample of large projects in which the average investment
is just above 16 million EUR. The same picture emerges when we consider investment per capita
(above and below the median - 2,459 EUR) in columns 3 and 4, and when we consider invest-
ment per area (above and below the median - 0.46 million EUR per hectare) in columns 5 and 6.
These results indicate that investment in urban renewal has no effects on population dynamics
even in the case of those projects that concentrate the highest sums of money.
Insert Table 3 here
6.2.2 Effects by neighborhood type
The results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the model’s prediction when a neighborhood
has surpassed the tipping point. Since neighborhoods are also heterogeneous with respect to
the initial minority share, we next test if the policy has been effective in settings where the initial
minority share was lower (P<P t in terms of the model). Since the exact location of the tipping
22Thus, the analogous graphs to Figure 2 are not reported.
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point is empirically unknown, we split the sample according to the percentage of immigrants
in the neighborhood in 200323. The results are reported in 4. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
for treated neighborhoods with a non-EU15 immigrant share below and above the median (12
percent), respectively. The results for the two sub-samples are qualitatively similar, corroborat-
ing the conclusion that the policy had no effects on neighborhood dynamics. Since the average
non-EU15 immigrant share is 6.6 percent in the sample with low immigration, the results sug-
gest that a high minority share is unlikely to account for the policy’s total lack of impact.
Insert Table 4 here
In the model presented in section 2 we considered two population groups, natives and im-
migrants. The two key elements in that model are that the natives’ income is higher than that
of the immigrants and, at the same time, the natives prefer neighborhoods where the share of
immigrants is low. Note, however, that preferences for neighbors might not be restricted to eth-
nicity. Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) have shown for the San Francisco Bay area that,
besides race, households prefer college-educated and rich neighbors. Hence, the two popula-
tion groups in the model could alternatively be interpreted as poor and rich, or neighbors with
high vs. low education (Glaeser, 2008). In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we explore heterogenous
patterns with respect to the level of education. Specifically, we consider treated units with a
population share (≥10 years of age) without a high-school diploma below and above the me-
dian (76.6%). The results also remain close to zero for the two sub-samples. Finally, in columns
5 and 6 we divided the sample considering treated units with a deprivation index below and
above the median (44.4), respectively. This index is a function of all the deprivation indicators
shown in the upper panel of Table 1 and, thus, the highest values indicate the greatest social
needs. Again, the results indicate no policy effects for the two sub-samples. Note, however, that
all the treated neighborhoods score above the deprivation index threshold set by policy-makers
in order to exclude non-deprived neighborhoods. In fact, most of the treated neighborhoods
are low-income neighborhoods that share a history of bad reputation and stigma (Nello, 2009).
Thus, the hypothesis that the ineffectiveness of the policy can be attributed to the unfavorable
social mix in the treated neighborhoods does not strike us as implausible.
The characteristics and location of the treated neighborhoods may also affect the impact of
the policy. In the model developed in Section 2, we only consider one exogenous amenity G ,
which reflects the quality of public spaces and facilities in the neighborhood. The policy guide-
lines distinguish between interventions in suburbs and historic districts; thus, it might be the
case that people value more highly investments in public spaces in historic districts given their
more central location and the (potential) historical-architectural value of the intervention ar-
eas. To explore this dimension of heterogeneity, in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 we report the
23Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) estimate tipping points for US cities and find a large degree of heterogeneity
across cities and over time. This finding suggests that tipping points are context specific and that they are not
generalizable.
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results for the impact of the urban renewal policy in suburbs (24 projects) and historic districts
(15 projects). In order to adapt the matching strategy to this analysis, we further include as con-
trol variables, an indicator for suburbs and historic districts in columns 1 and 2, respectively.24
Column 1 shows the estimates for the 24 suburbs, which indicate that there are no policy effects
in these deprived areas. Column 2 presents the results for the urban renewal projects in the
historic districts. Here, in contrast to all previous estimates, the results suggest that the urban
renewal policy did have some impact on population dynamics. Specifically, for this subset of
projects, interventions caused a 43% increase in the population of EU15 immigrants over the
nine-year period between 2004 and 2013. Given the moderate size of this population group, this
results in a modest .72 percentage point increase in the share of EU-15 immigrants in the treated
historic districts.
Insert Table 5 here
6.2.3 Interventions in Barcelona’s historic districts
Baum-Snow and Hartley (2016) and Couture and Handbury (2016) document that, between
2000 and 2010, city centers in US cities experienced a process of urban revival, with relative
increases in income and in the share of college graduates. A similar gentrification process has
occurred in Barcelona, the only large metropolitan area in the region. In the historic city center,
Ciutat Vella, the share of college graduates has increased by more than 16 percentage points
between 2001 and 2011, increasing from 13.7 to 30.4%25. Hence, one possible hypothesis to
emerge is that urban renewal projects in Barcelona’s historic districts have had significant im-
pacts. To test this, we split the sample between historic districts in Barcelona and those located
elsewhere. In column 4 in Table 5, we report the results for the three interventions in Barcelona
while in column 3 we show the results for the remaining 12 interventions26. Given that there
are only three treated neighborhoods, statistical inference based on the analytical standard er-
rors provided by Busso, Gregory and Kline (2014) might be misleading. To address this issue,
and following Gobillon and Magnac (2016), we build parameter estimates with 95% confidence
intervals based on the following bootstrap procedure. We draw three units from the entire pop-
ulation of treatments and controls and consider them as treated units, while the remaining units
correspond to the control group. We then estimate the treatment coefficients and replicate this
exercise 1,000 times. The 95% confidence interval is obtained as the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles
of the empirical distribution of these estimates.
24Note that these adjustments were not necessary for the exercises conducted in Table 4. There, the share of
non-EU15 immigrants, the population share without a college degree and all the variables entering the deprivation
index are already included among the controls considered when estimating equation 9. Hence, for the sample splits
in Table 4, treatments and controls are properly matched with respect to the variables used to split the samples.
25During the same period, the city-level share of college graduates also increased, but to a lesser extent, rising
from 21.2 to 32%.
26The three interventions in Barceona’s historic districts correspond to Santa Caterina i Sant Pau, Poble Sec and
La bordeta.
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The results show that, when considering the treated areas located in historic districts, ex-
cluding those in the city of Barcelona, the urban renewal policies have no significant effects on
population dynamics. This suggests that the results obtained in column 2 were entirely driven
by the projects in Barcelona. The results in column 4 confirm that this is indeed the case. Taken
at face value, the impact of the urban renewal projects in the historic districts of Barcelona are
quite large. Over the period 2004 to 2013, the policy increased the native and EU15 immigrant
populations by 13.4 and 70%, respectively. The point estimates, which are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, also imply that overall population increased by 9.3%, while the count of non-
EU15 immigrants fell by 25.2%. These different population growth rates meant considerable
changes in the composition of these neighborhoods with the share of natives and EU15 immi-
grants increasing by 3.4 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively, and the percentage of non-EU15
immigrants falling by 5.8 percentage points. These changes in the ethnic composition of neigh-
borhoods involved a sizable increase in the share of college graduates in the neighborhood.
Specifically, between 2001 and 2011, the urban renewal policy increased the population of col-
lege graduates by 98%, increasing the proportion of college graduates (among individuals aged
16 or more) by 16.2 percentage points. All in all, this indicates that the urban renewal projects
implemented in the city of Barcelona have intensified the ongoing gentrification of its city cen-
ter in the deprived historic neighborhoods targeted under the policy.
The effects recorded in Barcelona’s three historic districts coupled with the policy’s general
ineffectiveness elsewhere is consistent with a tipping story in which the policy is unable to sur-
pass the tipping point if the "big push" is of insufficient size. The share of non-EU15 immigrants
is not especially low in the treated neighborhoods of Barcelona’s historic districts. In fact, the
2003 (average) share of non-EU15 immigrants for these three projects is higher than the aver-
age recorded for all the treated neighborhoods (16.6 vs 14.0%). Hence, the low immigrant share
is unlikely to explain why the policy was effective there. Although we are unable to test this
hypothesis, the high historical-architectural value of these neighborhoods together with their
central location might explain the effectiveness of the Neighborhoods Act in Barcelona’s his-
toric districts. In their study of enterprise zones, Briant, Lafourcade and Schmutz (2015) also
document a high degree of heterogeneity with regards the effects of the policy and they show
that differences in accessibility across the treated neighborhoods may account for these hetero-
geneous policy effects.
One valid concern is the possibility that Barcelona’s historic districts might experience con-
temporaneous shocks in their population dynamics that may confound our estimates. To partly
address these concerns, we conduct a placebo test using Madrid, given that its city center also
underwent a process of urban revival in the period studied here. We select the three neigh-
borhoods in Madrid’s city center that are most similar to the three treated neighborhoods in
Barcelona in terms of their probability of being treated27. The pre-treatment population dy-
27To identify these three neighborhoods, we pool the sample of (121) controls and all the neighborhoods in
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namics of the three units selected in Madrid are reasonably similar to those of their Barcelona
counterparts. Figure 3 shows the evolution in population of the three treated units in Barcelona’s
historic districts (left panels) and of the three placebo units in Madrid (right panel). In contrast
to the results reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 5, these figures correspond to estimates in
which the lagged outcome is not included. Specifically, the specification of equation 9 corre-
sponds to that of column 2 in Table 2. The figure shows similar pre-treatment patterns, espe-
cially for the population shares of natives and non-EU15 immigrants. Admittedly, the share of
EU15 immigrants is growing in both cities albeit at a higher rate in Barcelona. Note, however,
that the estimates reported in Table 5 correspond to a specification in which treatments and
controls are exactly matched in terms of their pre-treatment outcomes, too. Reassuringly, the
estimates reported in the last column of Table 5 for Madrid indicate no effects.
6.3 Results at the census tract level
In the analyses reported above, the geographical unit of analysis has been the intervention area
as designated in the Neighborhoods Act grant applications. In many cases, however, there is
substantial heterogeneity in the amounts invested within these areas. For example, under Santa
Caterina i Sant Pere project (see map in Appendix B), the works carried out in the Pou de la
Figuera area (see top panel in Figure A.1) concentrated the lion’s share of funding (correspond-
ing to the largest colored area on the map). Since we know the exact location of all the invest-
ments made, we are able to re-run the analysis at the tract level (i.e. the areas delineated by
dashed lines on the map), which is the finest geographical detail for which our outcome vari-
ables are available. The estimations are presented in Table 6. For the baseline analysis (column
1), we have 412 treated and 317 non-treated tracts, reflecting the fact that the treated tracts (39)
are larger in area than the controls (103). One limitation of undertaking this analysis is that some
observations are lost when analyzing the educational composition of neighborhoods, given that
for reasons of statistical confidentiality the population by level of education is not disclosed for
all census tracts. Since tracts belonging to the same intervention area are not independent ob-
servations, we cluster the standard errors at this level of the intervention area. Moreover, as in
some of the exercises we conduct the number of clusters is low, we supplement the results with
p-values obtained with the clustered wild bootstrap procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2008)28.
Insert Table 6 here
(the municipality of) Madrid. With these data, we calculate the Oaxaca-Blinder weights as defined in Kline (2011),
reflecting the probability of treatment. The specification used includes the variables considered in column 2 of
Table 2, as well as an indicator for historic district. The probabilities of receiving treatment are plotted for all the
neighborhoods of Madrid in Appendix C. The highest probabilities are those of Embajadores, La Chopera and Palos
de Moguer which are the placebo treatments considered here.
28See Cameron and Miller (2015) for a discussion of standard errors clustering.
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The first column shows the baseline estimates. These correspond closely to the results re-
ported in the third column of Table 2, and indicate that the policy effects are, on average, null.
When we re-run the analysis considering only very large and localized projects (column 2), the
results indicate no effects, even when we focus specifically on the 30 tracts receiving the largest
sums of funding (above 3.5 million euros at the tract level). As for the characteristics of the
treated area, columns 3 and 4 report the estimates for interventions in the suburbs and the his-
toric districts, respectively. Since the results obtained in Table 5 indicated that the effects found
for historic districts were entirely driven by three interventions in Barcelona, in column 5 we re-
port the results excluding Barcelona. Finally, column 6 shows the treatment effects estimated for
the 42 census tracts belonging to the three projects carried out in historic districts in Barcelona.
Overall, our results are broadly consistent with those obtained when working with the interven-
tion areas. First, the policy has no impact on the population dynamics of the suburbs. Second,
when focusing on interventions in historic districts, the policy is found to reduce the share of
non-EU15 immigrants in the intervention tracts by almost 3 percentage points. Third, when
excluding the three projects in the historic districts of Barcelona, the result becomes statisti-
cally insignificant. Fourth, according to the (point) estimates, the urban renewal policies im-
plemented in the historic districts of Barcelona have had marked impacts on the population
dynamics of these neighborhoods. In the period 2004 to 2013, the policy increased the overall,
native and EU15 immigrant populations by 4, 8.9 and 50%, respectively, although the effect is
only statistically significant for this last variable. As a result, the share of natives and EU15 im-
migrants increased by 4.4 (non-significant) and 1.8 percentage points, while the percentage of
non-EU15 immigrants fell by 5.3 percentage points. As for changes in the educational compo-
sition, the policy increased the share of neighbors (with 16 years of age or more) with college
education by 10.6 percentage points.
7 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the impact on the population dynamics at the neighborhood level of a
prominent place-based policy (the Neighborhoods Act) implemented in some of the most de-
prived neighborhoods of the Spanish region of Catalonia in the period 2004-2010. The goal of
the policy was, by investing heavily in public spaces and facilities, to attract natives and high
income individuals and to reduce the concentration of poverty and immigration. The policy
has had little (if any) impact on the population composition and dynamics of the treated neigh-
borhoods. One notable exception, however, is that of the interventions that targeted the his-
toric districts of the city of Barcelona. There, the policy significantly increased the native and
EU-15 immigrant populations, reduced the non-EU15 immigrant share of the population and
increased the share of college graduates. Given that the city center is experiencing an ongoing
process of urban revival, the policy seems to have augmented this process into these deprived
21
neighborhoods.
The results of this paper indicate that income-mixing policies dependent on investments in
public spaces and facilities in neighborhoods in which poverty and immigration concentrate
are generally not effective, even in the case of high-cost projects. This finding contrasts with
the fact that, in the historic districts of Barcelona, the same policy has had a marked impact on
the population dynamics of the treated neighborhoods. This outcome is in line with previous
studies showing that the effects of place-based policies can be highly heterogeneous (Becker,
Egger and von Ehrlich, 2013; Briant, Lafourcade and Schmutz, 2015) and that successful policy
experiences cannot always be generalized to other urban contexts.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample balance: average of pre-treatment characteristics
Non-treated
Treated Non-treated reweighted Difference Difference
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3)
Matching variables (used in the Oaxaca-Blinder estimator)
Property value, relative to municipal average = 100, t-1 70.705 90.423 70.705 -19.718* 0.000
% of buildings in poor condition, 2001 5.192 3.372 5.192 1.820*** 0.000
% of buildings without pipe water, 2001 0.654 0.717 0.654 -0.063 0.000
% of buildings without sewerage connection, 2001 0.634 1.201 0.634 -0.567*** 0.000
% of >= 4 storey-buildings without elevator, 2001 65.507 66.038 65.507 -0.531 0.000
Density in 2003 (inhabitants per hectare, logged) 5.482 4.194 5.482 1.288*** 0.000
Population growth rate (2003 - 2001, %) 9.978 7.038 9.978 2.940 0.000
% of population 0-16 years, 2001 15.135 14.307 15.135 0.827 0.000
% of population >65 years, 2001 17.211 20.349 17.211 -3.138*** 0.000
% of non-EU15 immigrants in 2003 13.972 6.985 13.972 6.987*** 0.000
% of welfare benefits users, t-1 1.804 1.440 1.804 0.363 0.000
% unemployment, 2001 12.784 8.953 12.784 3.831*** 0.000
% of residents > 10 yrs, without a high-school diploma, 2001 75.653 73.867 75.653 1.786 0.000
% of people at risk of social exclusion, t-1 28.509 17.461 28.509 11.049 0.000
Public transportation: Presence, t-1 0.769 0.388 0.769 0.381*** 0.000
Public transportation: Freq. >= 30’, working hours, t-1 0.308 0.398 0.308 -0.090 0.000
Presence of public parking lots, t-1 0.359 0.194 0.359 0.165* 0.000
< 50 of buildings with private parking, t-1 0.897 0.612 0.897 0.286*** 0.000
Lack of parks and green areas, t-1 58.057 46.081 58.057 11.976** 0.000
% vacant commercial property, 2001 29.207 26.271 29.207 2.936 0.000
Population in 2003 (logged) 8.663 6.593 8.663 2.069*** 0.000
Variables not used in the matching procedure
∆ log natives (2004 - 2001) -0.023 0.002 -0.037 -0.025 0.014
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants (2004 - 2001) 1.090 0.840 1.033 0.250*** 0.057
∆ log EU15 immigrants (2004 - 2001) 0.186 0.139 0.107 0.047 0.079
∆ share of natives (2004 - 2001) -9.700 -4.580 -8.320 -5.120*** -1.380
∆ share of non-EU15 immigrants (2004 - 2001) 8.509 3.845 7.861 4.665*** 0.648
∆ share of EU15 immigrants (2004 - 2001) 0.105 0.122 -0.032 -0.017 0.137
Number of observations 39 103
Notes: Variables measured in 2001 drawn from the Census while variables measured in 2003 and 2004 are from population registers.
Variables referred to t-1 are provided by local councils through the project’s proposal.
Table 2: Impact of the urban renewal policy on ethnic and educational
composition
Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) OLS
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Ethnic composition, 2004-2013
∆ log population 0.022 0.054 0.002 0.016
(0.028) (0.039) (0.030) (0.027)
∆ log natives -0.006 0.017 -0.011 -0.010
(0.030) (0.040) (0.030) (0.026)
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants 0.087 0.116 0.082 0.080
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.068)
∆ log EU15 immigrants 0.042 0.084 0.078 0.039
(0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.089)
∆% of natives -1.398 -2.137 -0.871 -0.832
(1.235) (1.178)* (1.257) (1.018)
∆% of non-EU15 immigrants 0.783 1.485 0.266 0.499
(1.137) (1.061) (1.086) (0.886)
∆% of EU15 immigrants 0.307 0.224 0.269 0.077
(0.210) (0.209) (0.212) (0.132)
Educational composition, 2001-2011
∆ log pop. with college degree -0.161 -0.186 -.- -0.086
(0.180) (0.185) (0.171)
∆% of pop- with college degree -0.069 -0.288 -.- -0.194
(1.374) (1.389) (1.192)
Control variables
2001 census indicators Y Y Y Y
2003 population registers indicators Y Y Y Y
Other indicators Y N Y Y
Lagged outcome, 2001-2004 N N Y Ya
Number of observations 142
Number of treated observations 39
Notes: Each entry represents an outcome variable. Control variables enter the first
step in the Oaxaca-Blinder estimator (equation 9). 2001 census and 2003 population
registers indicators as shown in Table 1. Other indicators are the remaining variables in
the top panel of Table 1 used by policy-makers to determine treatment. a) The lagged
outcome is not included in the regressions of college-graduates as we do not have this
information. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level, ** sig-
nificant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 3: Impact of the urban renewal policy on ethnic and educational composition by level of investment.
Total Total Investment Investment Investment Investment
investment < investment > per capita < per capita > per He < per He >
the median the median the median the median the median the median
Ethnic composition, 2004-2013
∆ log population 0.028 -0.022 0.026 -0.021 0.010 -0.005
(0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.042)
∆ log natives 0.025 -0.045 -0.005 -0.017 -0.026 0.003
(0.041) (0.039) (0.033) (0.044) (0.032) (0.046)
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants 0.073 0.091 0.075 0.090 0.088 0.077
(0.101) (0.106) (0.115) (0.087) (0.115) (0.088)
∆ log EU15 immigrants 0.095 0.061 0.045 0.109 0.043 0.111
(0.131) (0.147) (0.141) (0.131) (0.142) (0.132)
∆% of natives -0.152 -1.554 -2.035 0.235 -2.358 0.542
(1.589) (1.544) (1.428) (1.665) (1.478) (1.581)
∆% of non-EU15 immigrants -0.173 0.684 0.554 -0.008 0.836 -0.275
(1.392) (1.380) (1.251) (1.529) (1.307) (1.458)
∆% of EU15 immigrants 0.079 0.451 0.496 0.054 0.495 0.055
(0.141) (0.373) (0.380) (0.154) (0.380) (0.158)
Educational composition, 2001-2011
∆ log pop. with college degree 0.039 -0.351 -0.078 -0.239 -0.186 -0.137
(0.236) (0.244) (0.253) (0.232) (0.248) (0.239)
∆% pop. with college degree 0.555 -0.662 0.618 -0.721 0.191 -0.315
(1.434) (2.100) (2.046) (1.613) (2.062) (1.614)
Number of observations 122 123 122 123 122 123
Number of treated observations 19 20 19 20 19 20
Notes: OB estimates, with each entry representing one outcome variable. Control variables include all variables in Table 1, as well as the 2001-2004 lagged
outcome in the ethnic composition outcomes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10%
level.
Table 4: Impact of the urban renewal policy on ethnic and educational composition by neighborhood characteristics
Initial Initial % of low % of low Treated with Treated with
% of non-EU15 % of non-EU15 educated educated deprivation deprivation
< the median > the median residents > residents < index < index >
the median the median the median the median
Ethnic composition, 2004-2013
∆ log population 0.030 -0.014 -0.038 0.044 0.038 -0.032
(0.037) (0.076) (0.040) (0.044) (0.035) (0.047)
∆ log natives 0.014 -0.046 -0.071 0.052 0.018 -0.039
(0.039) (0.069) (0.044) (0.044) (0.035) (0.047)
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants 0.030 0.117 0.144 0.017 0.080 0.085
(0.101) (0.151) (0.108) (0.108) (0.098) (0.106)
∆ log EU15 immigrants 0.036 0.118 -0.166 0.334 0.033 0.120
(0.108) (0.220) (0.111) (0.162)** (0.096) (0.167)
∆% of natives -1.536 -2.232 -2.022 0.341 -1.525 -0.249
(1.436) (1.935) (1.815) (1.524) (1.384) (1.852)
∆% of non-EU15 immigrants 0.938 1.179 1.452 -0.982 0.779 -0.221
(1.174) (1.924) (1.521) (1.353) (1.104) (1.679)
∆% of EU15 immigrants 0.093 0.497 0.009 0.543 0.171 0.363
(0.141) (0.457) (0.137) (0.390) (0.134) (0.376)
Educational composition, 2001-2011
∆ log pop. with college degree 0.193 -0.277 -0.267 -0.049 0.140 -0.446
(0.155) (0.320) (0.232) (0.262) (0.183) (0.273)
∆% of pop- with college degree 1.542 -0.966 -1.880 1.838 1.727 -1.775
(1.436) (2.530) (1.368) (2.226) (1.372) (2.173)
Number of observations 122 123 123 122 122 123
Number of treated observation 19 20 20 19 19 20
Notes: OB estimates, with each entry representing one outcome variable. Control variables include all variables in Table 1, as well as the 2001-2004 lagged
outcome in the ethnic composition outcomes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10%
level.
Table 5: Impact of the urban renewal policy on demographic variables and education outcomes: Suburbs
versus historic districts
Historic Historic Historic
Historic districts, without districts districts, Madrid
Suburbs districts Barcelona in Barcelona placebo test
Ethnic composition, 2004-2013
∆ log population -0.039 0.027 0.015 0.093 -0.060
(0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.073) (0.051)
[-0.160 ; 0.049] [-0.137 ; 0.119] [-0.151 ; 0.132] [-1.026 ; 0.270]
∆ log natives -0.072 0.053 0.041 0.134 -0.065
(0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.079)* (0.051)
[-0.153 ; 0.007] [-0.097 ; 0.150] [-0.124 ; 0.144] [-0.404 ; 0.313]
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants 0.033 0.021 0.060 -0.252 -0.029
(0.105) (0.128) (0.136) (0.222) (0.100)
[-0.138 ; 0.223] [-0.270 ; 0.235] [-0.232 ; 0.340] [-1.015 ; 0.280]
∆ log EU15 immigrants -0.142 0.427 0.330 0.702 -0.211
(0.130) (0.194)** (0.201) (0.301)** (0.139)
[-0.422 ; 0.085] [0.036 ; 0.702] [-0.092 ; 0.660] [-0.182 ; 1.375]
∆% of natives -2.063 1.924 1.756 3.379 -0.431
(1.464) (1.948) (2.223) (2.860) (0.964)
[-4.108 ; -0.385] [-0.588 ; 4.156] [-0.827 ; 4.564] [-1.599 ; 11.262]
∆% of non-EU15 immigrants 0.948 -1.573 -0.705 -5.786 0.340
(1.221) (1.792) (1.983) (2.990)* (2.067)
[-.401 ; 2.747] [-3.385 ; 0.775] [-2.964 ; 1.790] [-9.932 ; -0.666]
∆% of EU15 immigrants 0.003 0.722 0.193 2.523 -0.603
(0.163) (0.474) (0.210) (1.361)* (0.587)
[-0.350 ; 0.371] [0.062 ; 1.255] [-0.276 ; 0.582] [1.512 ; 3.744]
Educational composition, 2001-2011
∆ log pop. with college degree -0.330 -0.019 -0.241 0.978 -0.178
(0.215) (0.330) (0.380) (0.303)*** (0.183)
[-0.687 ; -0.003] [-0.549 ; 0.340] [-0.976 ; 0.221] [-1.135 ; 1.580]
∆% pop. with college degree -1.692 2.249 -1.003 16.176 1.009
(1.254) (2.810) (2.497) (3.638)*** (3.765)
[-3.863 ; 0.620] [-1.980 ; 5.825] [-5.477 ; 2.939] [4.604 ; 25.901]
Number of observations 127 118 115 106 128
Number of treated observations 24 15 12 3 3
Notes: OB estimates, with each entry representing one outcome variable. Control variables include i) all variables in Table 1, ii)
the 2001-2004 lagged outcome in the ethnic composition outcomes, and iii) an indicator for suburbs (column 1), an indicator for
historic district (columns 2 and 3), and two indicators for historic district and municipality of Barcelona (column 4). Analytical robust
standard errors in parenthesis where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. In brackets, bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. In each column, each replica draws the corresponding number of treated
observations (e.g. 3 for Barcelona’s historic districts) and considers the rest as control units.
Table 6: Impact of the urban renewal policy on demographic variables and education. Results at the tract
level
Investment Historic
in the tract > districts, Historic
90th pctile Historic without districts in
Baseline 3.5M Euros Suburbs districts Barcelona Barcelona
Ethnic composition, 2004-2013
∆ log population 0.021 -0.071 -0.003 0.049 0.047 0.040
(0.026) (0.037) (0.029) (0.043) (0.047) (0.060)
[.731] [.110] [.950] [.455] [.521] [.555]
∆ log natives 0.030 -0.038 -0.014 0.097 0.094 0.089
(0.023) (0.036) (0.026) (0.039) (0.041) (0.063)
[.796] [.449] [.954] [.178] [.277] [.234]
∆ log non-EU15 immigrants 0.052 -0.111 0.032 0.084 0.137 -0.206
(0.079) (0.111) (0.089) (0.124) (0.131) (0.184)
[.611] [.333] [.756] [.567] [.421] [.265]
∆ log EU15 immigrants 0.102 0.168 -0.056 0.313 0.239 0.502
(0.097) (0.159) (0.085) (0.180) (0.163) (0.273)*
[.473] [.269] [.687] [.172] [.297] [.054]c
∆% of natives 0.401 1.968 -0.911 3.223 2.943 4.383
(1.139) (1.733) (1.350) (1.594) (1.761) (2.896)
[.842] [.261] [.511] [.124] [.202] [.138]
∆% of non-EU15 immigrants -0.957 -2.106 0.050 -2.963 -2.537 -5.285
(0.931) (1.622) (1.071) (1.342)** (1.496) (2.181)**
[.423] [.202] [.970] [.046]b [.114] [.026]b
∆% of EU15 immigrants 0.232 0.401 0.012 0.452 0.118 1.828
(0.211) (0.351) (0.137) (0.436) (0.197) (1.275)**
[.347] [.299] [.940] [.371] [.655] [.050]b
Number of observations 729 347 572 474 432 359
Number of treated observations 412 30 255 157 115 42
Educational composition
∆ log pop. with college degree -0.068 -0.271 -0.303 0.063 -0.079 0.505
(0.182) (0.340) (0.188) (0.371) (0.425) (0.410)
[.794] [.437] [.148] [.876] [.890] [.281]
∆% pop. with college degree -0.043 -0.396 -1.219 1.693 -1.090 10.590
(1.254) (2.277) (1.164) (2.501) (1.993) (3.715)***
[.982] [.852] [.277] [.561] [.627] [.008]a
Number of observations 609 311 474 423 381 330
Number of treated observations 412 30 255 157 115 42
Notes: OB estimates, with each entry representing one outcome variable. Control variables are all 2001 census
variables listed in 2. Clustered standard errors at the proposed area of intervention in parenthesis where ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Alternatively, p-value in squared brackets from
a clustered wild bootstrap procedure (with 1000 replications) developed by (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller,
2008) where a , b and c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
Figures
Figure 1: Model illustrations
(a) Immigrant share equilibria
(b) The effect of the urban renewal policy on the minority share
The urban renewal policy is modelled as an increase in the neighborhood’s amenity (↑G).
In this illustration, we assume that γI = 0, implying that increasing G does not affect the
immigrants’ willingness to pay. B is the post-intervention new minority share.
(c) Urban renewal policy and tipping reversal
Starting from A, there is an increase in the city-wide minority share P , shifting immigrants’
willingness to pay upwards (gray solid line). As a result, B is the new ghetto equilibrium.
The urban renewal policy is then implemented (↑G) which shifts natives’ willingness to pay
upwards (gray dashed line). In this illustration, we assume γI = 0, implying that higher G
does not shift immigrants’ willingness to pay. Hence, the post intervention equilibrium is
point C.
Figure 2: Evolution of demographic outcome variables
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Figure 3: Evolution of demographic outcome variables. Historic districts in Barcelona
vs historic districts in Madrid.
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Appendix A Example of an urban renewal policy
Figure A.1: Santa Caterina i Sant Pere, Barcelona, 15MER
(a) Public spaces: Pou de la Figuera
(b) Public facilities: Convent de Sant Agustí
Appendix B Consolidating intervention areas with census tracts:
An example
Figure B.1: Santa Caterina i Sant Pere, Barcelona
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AEX, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP,swisstopo, and the GIS User Community
Dashed lines indicate census tracts boundaries while the solid line delineates the intervention area. The col-
ored areas indicate the exact location of all investments.
Appendix C Placebo analysis for Madrid
Figure C.1: Probability of treatment (Oaxaca-Blinder weights)
Oaxaca-Blinder Weights
[-0,026 , -0,015]
[-0,014 , -0,007]
[-0,006 , 0,001]
[0,002 , 0,007]
[0,008 , 0,013]
[0,014 , 0,021]
[0,037 , 0,044]
Neighborhoods (barrios) as defined by the Madrid’s city council. Oaxaca-Blinder weights as defined in Kline
(2011) reflect the probability of treatment. The specification used includes the variables considered in column
2 of Table 4, as well as an indicator for historic districts. The highest 3 values are Embajadores, La Chopera and
Palos de Moguer.
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